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Introduction 
 
With austerity and increasing concerns around the financial sustainability of public services 
(NAO 2013, 2014), the importance of accountability and transparency arrangements being 
‘fit for purpose’ to provide public assurance and ascertain value for money cannot be over-
estimated. Nowhere is this more so than in central and local government relations where 
power and control is severely contended (Wildavsky 1964; Rhodes 1999; Wilson and Game 
2011).  
 
This paper is a descriptive review of legislative, policy and organisational developments of 
local government in England, where under a Conservative led Coalition central government 
from 2010-2015 the accountability and transparency arrangements were subject to significant 
change.  
 
As the paper will demonstrate, in a developed democracy such as the UK, accountability 
through professional audit of performance as well as conformance cannot simply be replaced 
with transparency (Hood 2010; Pollitt and Hupe 2011). The study will also show however 
that this can change overtime and indeed is not necessarily the case for other jurisdictions 
(Goetz and Jenkins 2001; Samaratunge et al 2008; Estreller-More and Otero 2012). It 
therefore calls for more detailed research in comparative contexts. 
 
The paper begins with a discussion of the literature on accountability and transparency and 
what this means for public management, before contextualising it to the local government in 
England. It suggests five themes that are globally relevant for policy makers and practitioners 
before drawing some generalised conclusions. 
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Accountability and Transparency 
 
One question often raised is whether accountability and transparency are the same thing, 
support one another or can undermine one another (Meijer 2014). Hood (2010) refers to this 
as Siamese twins, matching parts and awkward couple. Before answering this question it is 
useful to determine, for the purposes of this paper, what is meant by the terms accountability 
and transparency. 
 
Accountability is an obligation to provide an account to someone with a legitimate interest. It 
involves a counting of possessions and the classifying of information on the basis of norms 
and conventions. Its historic origins were therefore formalised through the practice of book 
keeping and the discipline of accounting (Bovens, Goodin and Schillemans 2014). For the 
public services in the UK, the formalisation of accountability was initially manifested 
through accounting as an assessment by an audit (financial conformance). More recently the 
accounting aspect of assessment has been further formalised through detailed performance 
management arrangements (operational performance) and ever expanding regulation (Bodies 
that perform assessment increasingly cover every aspect of accountability from health and 
safety to equality etc) (Power 1997). This expanding remit has been championed for 
strengthening accountability (Cambell-Smith 2008; Audit Commission 2009), but while it 
has had benefits there have also been negative effects (Downe et al. 2010; Martin et al. 2013). 
This includes being challenged on cost grounds and whether it provide overall value for 
money, not least by the Local Government Association in its evidence to the House of 
Commons Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Select Committee 
when considering the future of audit and inspection (House of Commons 2011).  
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In contrast to accountability, transparency champions openness as a means to prevent abuses 
of power, which has had a strong influence on democratic governance (Bovens, Goodin and 
Schillemans 2014). Initially, transparency was formalised in the UK public services through 
an opening up of archives, making minutes publicly available, and unlocking meetings for 
public attendance. This was to make information, data and discussion more open, visible and 
free as part of transparency processes that support accountability. In recent decades, 
transparency in the UK and elsewhere has increased through the Freedom of Information Act 
and other initiatives and especially following the opportunities to share data and meetings 
online through the internet and e-government where there has been an exponential increase in 
data availability. For example, the transparency agenda in England requires certain public 
bodies such as local authorities to publish all transactions over £500 making them open to the 
full democratic scrutiny of the public. This increase in data availability has been championed 
as a cost effective means to afford a measure of accountability (DCLG 2011). Unfortunately 
it has also been challenged as simply generating data overload as the raw data still needs to 
be interpreted through an expert medium to become useful information.  
 
With the terms defined, it is important to highlight that accountability and transparency can 
work differently both individually and together depending on the context. For example, in the 
United States of America (USA) citizens have not become the armchair auditors that was 
envisaged through transparency initiatives. This is because citizens did not have the time, 
money, expertise or inclination to do so. It therefore questions if transparency can be a 
substitute for accountability (Etzioni 2014). In the UK there has been similar criticisms of 
transparency as a substitute for accountability, and questioning on whether it is a suitable 
replacement for aspects of formalised audit (Eckersley, Ferry and Zakaria 2014; Ferry and 
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Eckersley 2015b). In addition, empirical research from Portugal has highlighted a failure to 
produce proper tools to compare government transparency practices (Cruz et al. 2016). 
However, there are international examples from China and India among others that show 
transparency can reinforce or even replace inadequate accountability mechanisms (Ferry and 
Eckersley 2015a).  
 
Central and Local Government Relationships  
 
In the context of austerity and fears around the financial sustainability of public services, in a 
democracy, the importance of accountability and transparency arrangements needs to be of 
central importance to the state and public.  
 
With this in mind, politicians and public managers who wish to reform state institutions need 
to take account of the relationship between central and local government, and their 
relationship to the public, because they exert a significant influence on policy making 
(Moynihan 2008). For example, the nature of these relationships raises specific issues 
regarding centralisation and decentralisation, service determination, and funding 
arrangements. In addition, literature has highlighted various specific challenges of 
implementation around performance management in the public sector (van Dooren, 
Bouckaert and Halligan 2015), particularly with regard to sub-national tiers of government 
(Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge 2009).  
 
Over recent decades in order to facilitate accountability, various governments have brought in 
significant performance management frameworks and thereby accumulated more information 
about how sub-national levels of government are operating than at any point in the past. 
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However as governments have emphasized some aspects of performance management such 
as building measurement systems to acquire more performance data, they have also neglected 
wider organizational change that would facilitate the use of such information at the 
implementation level (Moynihan 2008; van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan 2015).  
 
In the context of the UK, power and control has been an ongoing contestation in central and 
local government relations over service determination, performance management and funding 
arrangements (Rhodes 1999; Wilson and Game 2011). There has been a gradual 
centralisation of funding that has not abated since the poll tax (a local tax on housing) was 
axed in the early 1990’s, and England has become the country with the most central control 
over local government funds of the major Western European Countries (Ferry, Eckersley and 
van Dooren 2015). 
 
Since the early 1980s successive UK governments have also supplemented financial controls, 
through audit for financial conformance, with a range of centralised performance 
management frameworks that set out how local government should operate and what they 
should focus on (Seal 1999, 2003; Seal and Ball 2005, 2006, 2011). The performance of 
individual local authorities was then monitored against these frameworks through a 
comprehensive system of indicators and external audit and inspection, in order to try and 
create a “golden thread” that linked ministerial objectives and pronouncements with the 
administration of policy at the local level (Micheli and Neely 2010). These initiatives sought 
to facilitate the continuous improvement of public services and assessed this improvement 
through the “economy, efficiency and effectiveness” with which local authorities delivered 
services – and these value for money objectives were reflected in performance frameworks 
and indicators (Hopwood 1984). 
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In contrast, since 2010 the Conservative led Coalition Government has embraced a policy of 
‘austerity localism’ (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012), and undertaken governing and budgeting 
for deficit reduction through changes to the spending review, budget, and audit and 
accountability arrangements (Ferry and Eckersley 2011, 2012, 2015b). For example, reforms 
such as the Localism Act 2011 have given local authorities greater autonomy over spending 
decisions but not local revenue generation. Other changes have seen the abolition of the 
Audit Commission, which previously co-ordinated and delivered external audit, inspection 
and national reports on locally delivered public services in the UK (Timmins and Gash 2014), 
and the abandonment of performance management frameworks and performance audit that 
has meant that since 2010 local authorities are less focussed on service outputs and outcomes 
than was previously the case (NAO 2014).  
 
The Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 confirmed that future local authority audits 
would be overseen centrally by the NAO, focus solely on financial management, and have no 
performance assessment (Ellwood 2014). This, together with the prevailing austerity, made 
‘financial conformance’ rather than ‘operational performance’ the overriding focus, for both 
central and local government (NAO 2014b) and ostensibly weakened local accountability 
because it obscured the potential impact of austerity cuts (Ferry and Eckersley 2015b).  
 
The NAO have recently demonstrated how ‘changes in public service provision have 
increased the risk of provider failure’ (NAO 2015 p. 9) and the accountability deficit for 
performance at an ‘individual’ local authority level is only partially addressed through the 
NAO (2014a) value for money report on ‘financial sustainability’. The ‘lack’ or inadequacy 
of performance information currently available also makes assessing the value for money 
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aspects of financial sustainability a challenge. The NAO’s obligation is essentially reduced to 
highlighting the risks that certain local authorities may not be able to set a balanced budget or 
fulfil statutory duties. The key messages of its 2014 local government report include:- 
 
“There is little evidence of the extent to which local authorities have made savings 
through efficiencies rather than service reductions. Other than data on children’s and 
adult social care, there are almost no data on local authority outputs and activities. 
Assessing how far savings have impacted on service users for most service areas, 
based on comparable national data is not possible for the most part” (NAO 2014b p. 
9). 
 
Essentially, the NAO suggest that the new accountability and audit arrangements let us know 
if the DCLG and local authorities are spending within budget, but not what value the public 
are getting for their money.  
 
In addition, in a wider sense, the diversification of delivery mechanisms, which are also being 
encouraged by the coalition government, has created much more complex accountability 
relationships (Shaoul, Stafford and Stapleton 2012; NAO 2013, 2015), and local authorities 
recognise that their traditional organisational remit and funding arrangements also have to 
change thus altering the risk profile of authorities (Ferry, Coombs and Eckersley in press).  
 
To make up for the diminution in accountability arrangements, the transparency agenda led to 
ministerial claims that an army of ‘armchair auditors’ would fill the accountability void 
created by the closure of the Audit Commission and the abandonment of performance audit 
(DCLG 2010b, 2011), but this has demonstrably failed to materialise with the result that local 
9 
 
authorities are not comprehensively or robustly assessed on the quality of service outputs and 
outcomes (Eckersley, Ferry and Zakaria 2014). This combined with austerity has reinforced 
the principle that holding down input costs through an over-riding focus on budgetary 
stewardship is the pre-dominant managerial objective within local authorities, and this means 
that there is reduced scope for officers to innovate or try new ideas (Ferry, Coombs and 
Eckersley in press). In effect, the transparency agenda in England forms a mere apologia and 
is an inadequate substitute for the level and sophistication of accountability that can be 
afforded by independent professional auditors assessing performance (Ferry, Eckersley and 
Zakaria 2015). However, it is important to caution here that this need not always be the case 
as context, culture and politics can play a role alongside other contingent variables (; Ospina, 
Grau and Zaltsman 2004; Molnar 2008; Hood 2010; Willems and van Dooren 2012; So 2014; 
Ferry and Eckersley 2015a). 
 
Although the public do not appear to be ready to embrace the auditor role (Etzioni 2014), 
policy contestation is being influenced and in some cases changed through social movements, 
political protests, citizen participation and other bottom up grassroots initiatives (Ball and 
Seal 2005), especially under the recent austerity localism that led to various co-option 
strategies (Ahrens and Ferry 2015).   
 
In England, over the last five years, it is contended that the accountability arrangements have 
diminished and not been adequately replaced by transparency initiatives. Research from 
elsewhere however suggests that over the longer term some performance information use will 
be re-introduced as financial stress eases and the focus once again shifts back to value for 
money and not merely cutback management (Wildavsky 1975; Moynihan 2008; Raudla, 
Savi, and Liedemann 2013). This is very important and a number of themes can be set out for 
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critical reflection by global policy makers and practitioners alike. This may contribute to a 
broader debate on accountability and transparency which are particularly important pillars 
underpinning our democratic system of governance, but are also important to jurisdictions 
with other forms of governance. Five themes from our study will now be set out, to be 
followed by some generalised conclusions. 
 
Five Themes from Local Government in England 
 
Theme 1 – Transparency may not adequately replace accountability 
 
For English local government the accountability and transparency arrangements are now part 
of a more complex organisational landscape wherein it is contended that accountability has 
been reduced and not adequately replaced by increased transparency.  
 
For example, in terms of accountability the emphasis is now firmly on financial conformance 
and Sector Led Improvement (SLI) by local government themselves (House of Commons 
2011). Value for money capability has been significantly reduced following abolition of the 
Audit Commission and decommissioning of corporate performance management 
arrangements. Policy makers must decide if they need to strengthen accountability 
particularly when austerity recedes and the focus on cutback management becomes less 
paramount and gives way to a revised interest in value for money. 
 
Local authorities are established in statute, responsible to their electorate for the spending 
decisions they make, and have responsibilities mainly covered by a framework of legal duties 
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which set out what they must do and set checks and balances on their actions. These duties 
include the role of officers and councillors, and accountability to the public.  
 
 Local authorities are also subject to strict financial controls and accountable to the public. 
The principal local checks on regularity and propriety cover clarity about who is responsible 
for resources, a set of financial duties and rules that require prudence in spending, internal 
checks that the rules are being followed, and external checks by an independent auditor. 
 
Audit arrangements are now subject to the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, which 
repealed the Audit Commission Act 1998 and reformed the processes for performance and 
financial audit of local government. These reforms included abolishing the Audit 
Commission (which closed on the 31st March 2015) and transferring a number of its 
responsibilities to other organisations, including the NAO. In the place of the Audit 
Commission, there is a new framework for local public audit, due to start after the 
Commission's current contracts with audit suppliers end in 2016/17, or potentially in 2019/20 
if all the contracts are extended. A transitional body Public Sector Audit Appointments 
Limited (PSAA) will oversee the contracts in the intervening period. The NAO will produce 
the code of practice and supporting guidelines for local authorities, as well as enhance its 
existing value for money studies by conducting a small number of reports into local public 
service delivery.  
 
Once the transitional audit arrangements come to an end, local public sector bodies will have 
the power to appoint their own auditors, although local bodies can collaborate and continue to 
procure audit at a collective or national level (Timmins and Gash 2014).  
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The changes to the audit arrangements require local authorities to adjust to dealing with a 
wider range of organisations than at present including the PSAA, NAO, Cabinet Office and 
DCLG. Local authorities will have to liaise with government departments, regulators and 
auditors about various issues previously dealt with or coordinated by the Audit Commission.  
 
The Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 does not provide for the national collation and 
reporting of the results of local audits, although PSAA will publish information on the results 
of auditors’ work with local government bodies until current contracts come to an end. After 
that, there has been no clear or specific commitment to produce reports setting out the big 
picture across local government or health services.  
 
In short, the new arrangements for local audit break up the old regulatory framework. The 
NAO, Financial Reporting Council, Recognised Supervisory Bodies, local auditor panels and 
audit firms will all have parts to play in the new landscape. This creates a number of 
uncertainties about how local appointment and oversight of auditors will work. 
 
In terms of performance management, the coalition government has dismantled much of the 
performance management framework for local government, replacing centrally driven 
performance reporting and data requirements in favour of sector self-regulation, transparency 
and local accountability. 
 
Following the abolition of national performance frameworks, local authorities and the LGA 
introduced a SLI approach to improvement (House of Commons 2011; LGA 2011; Timmins 
and Gash 2014). This is based on four underlying principles: Local authorities are responsible 
for their own performance; local authorities should be accountable locally not nationally; 
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there is a sense of collective responsibility for the performance of the sector as a whole; and 
the role of the LGA is to provide tools and support (LGA 2011, 2014, 2015). 
 
The LGA offers a range of practical support to encourage and enable local authorities to 
exploit the opportunities that this approach to improvement provides. This includes support 
of a corporate nature such as leadership programmes, peer challenge, a benchmarking service 
(LG Inform), as well as programmes tailored to specific sectors – such as children's, adults, 
health, care, financial, culture, tourism, sport and planning services.  
 
With regards to transparency, the Local Authority (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and 
Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012 introduced (marginally) greater 
transparency and access to local authority meetings.  
 
In addition, the Local Government Transparency Code, which has been updated twice since 
its introduction (DCLG 2015), lists a range of datasets that local authorities must make 
available to the public. These include publication of annual accounts and each line of 
spending worth over £500. It also comprises senior employee salaries, councillor allowances 
and expenses, copies of contracts and tenders, and grants to the voluntary and social 
enterprise sectors. Furthermore, it includes policies, performance and external audit, and 
covers key inspections although there are no longer any external corporate inspections. 
 
The Code does not replace or supersede the existing legal framework for access to and re-use 
of public sector information. This framework is set out in the Freedom of Information Act 
2000, Environmental Information Regulations 2004, re-use of Public Sector Information 
Regulations 2005, Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community 
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Regulations 2009, and Section 15 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 that provides a right for 
individuals to inspect a local authority’s accounting records and supporting documentation, 
and to make copies of them, for a limited period each year. 
 
Theme 2 – Loss of formal information and interrogation capacity has not been replaced 
by informal arrangements 
 
Information and its Interrogation have both suffered a significant loss of capacity partially 
due to the abolition of the Audit Commission and the dismantling of performance 
management arrangements.  
 
The army of ‘armchair auditors’ envisioned by the government (DCLG 2010b), have not 
materialised to fill the accountability deficit (Ferry and Eckersley 2015b). Practitioners have 
to understand the significant challenges this creates in being able to ascertain what 
programmes to undertake and determine which are providing value for money. The 
diminishing evidence base leaves things more open to opinion and politics. Citizens may 
therefore judge on a diverse range of things, and there is relatively less independent evidence 
to refute or support such judgments. 
 
DCLG’s local authority statistics and CIPFA’s financial and performance databases allow for 
investigation and analysis of expenditure and performance information, although the latter is 
only available to subscribers.  
 
However, the collection, analysis, availability, transparency and interrogation of these data 
and other local authority statistics has become increasingly difficult since 2010. This largely 
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results from the loss of the Audit Commission’s operational research and evaluation capacity. 
Fr example the Audit Commission produced numerous reports on local government, value for 
money and improvement between 1983 and 2010, and a more limited range between 2010 
and 2015. This follows on from the earlier closure of the ‘Improvement and Development 
Agency (IDeA)’ for local government. In addition, there has been a significant reduction in 
DCLG’s internal research and evaluation capacity, as well as that of external bodies. 
Although ministers argued initially that volunteer ‘armchair auditors’ would step into the gap 
created by the Audit Commission’s abolition, and analyse the data published under 
transparency requirements, this has not proved to be the case. Even if this army of volunteer 
researchers had emerged, they would be unable to draw meaningful conclusions and 
recommendations from the raw data that has become available (House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee 2015).  
 
The loss of capacity has only been partially compensated for by the development of 
operational research capacity and capability at the NAO. Historically there has been some 
independent academic research capacity in the management of local authorities. However, as 
evidenced in the proceedings and minutes of the Public Administration Committee of the 
Joint Universities Council, public management academic research and teaching in general, 
has been under pressure and significantly declining over the past five years as reductions in 
public expenditure and increases in tuition fees in England have knock on effects in terms of 
enrolments and appointments.   
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Theme 3 – Austerity and cutback management will challenge governance relationships 
 
During the recent sustained period of austerity in England, the theory and practice of cutback 
management has been adopted. These new arrangements coupled with localism for English 
local government (Lowndes and Pratchet 2012) have provided a significant challenge for 
practitioners in the governance of their local authorities, leadership of services, and strategic 
alignment of plans and delivery especially those involving multiple partners.  
 
Practitioners must therefore understand these pressures and manage the risks associated with 
cutback management, but also make provision for governance, leadership and strategic 
alignment for the future when austerity recedes and value for money becomes more 
paramount.    
 
To assist good governance, CIPFA and the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives 
(SOLACE) issued Delivering Good Governance in Local Government: Framework and 
Accompanying Guidance Note in 2007, which was updated in 2012 through an addendum and 
revisions.  
 
Good governance is important to all involved in local government and maintaining and 
improving governance is a key responsibility of the Leader of the Council and the Head of 
Paid Service (Chief Executive Officer or their equivalent). There are also designated statutory 
roles and responsibilities for a local authority’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial 
Officer and the Monitoring Officer. The local authority is legally obliged to maintain a 
balanced budget and the Chief Financial Officer discharges this statutory function. 
Additionally, there are statutory requirements associated with the roles and responsibilities of 
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the Director of Children’s Services and the Director of Adult Services. There is also a 
responsibility on all members of the leadership team, full council or authority, and those 
responsible for monitoring and providing assurance on governance arrangements for ensuring 
strategic alignment.  
 
With regards to strategic alignment, DCLG awarded the CIPFA/SOLACE Framework 
‘proper practices’ status through non-statutory guidance. As a result, local authorities must 
prepare and publish an annual governance statement to accompany the statement of accounts 
in order to meet a statutory requirement set out in Regulation 4(2) of the Accounts and Audit 
Regulations 2003, as amended by the Accounts and Audit (Amendment) (England) 
Regulations 2006. This regulation requires local authorities to prepare a statement of internal 
control in accordance with the Framework’s ‘proper practices’ for developing and 
maintaining a local code of governance and for discharging accountability for the proper 
conduct of public business. These statements follow a standardised template set out in the 
framework, in which local authorities make their practices and structures open and explicit, 
and map them against agreed best practice. This helps to ensure that governance practices are 
strategically aligned. 
 
Good governance enables a local authority’s leadership to pursue its vision effectively, and 
also underpins that vision with control and the management of risk for strategic alignment. 
However, that strategic alignment is under pressure, because local government has been 
undergoing significant change in an increasingly complex environment. In addition to 
economic and financial sustainability challenges, the Localism Act and other legislation has 
brought new roles, opportunities and greater flexibility. Furthermore, local authorities have 
been changing their models of service delivery for some time (Alford and O’Flynn 2012); 
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local public services are now delivered directly, through partnerships, collaboration, and 
commissioning, and by combined authorities. The introduction of new structures and ways of 
working provide challenges for strategic alignment in managing risk, ensuring transparency, 
and demonstrating accountability (Shaoul, Stafford and Stapleton 2012).  
 
Theme 4 – A reduction in performance information is constraining public reporting, 
scrutiny and public assurance 
 
The changes to performance management information in particular has meant that reporting 
is more partial, scrutiny has become more variable, structures have changed, and quality 
assurance is receding with the demise of professionalised performance audit. Public 
assurance of value for money is therefore more difficult to establish.  
 
Intervention is still available via SLI (Bennett et al. 2014), but practitioners are implicitly 
expected to ensure arrangements are in place to mitigate the reporting and scrutiny shortfalls 
and work with the wider local government community to support the SLI regime.  
 
Local authority financial reporting to central government now focuses solely on financial 
information. The reports are based on the statutory requirement for local authorities to ensure 
accountability and transparency for financial stewardship, which is set out in the Local 
Government Act 1972. A single individual, the Section 151 Officer (who is often the finance 
director, and must be a qualified accountant), is personally responsible for producing a 
balanced revenue budget every year. The Local Government Act 2003 makes a balanced 
budget a requirement and the Section 151 officer has to report on the robustness of estimates 
and adequacy of reserves. These budgets and reports are then subject to a financial audit.  
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Since 2010 there has been no statutory requirement for local authorities to produce 
performance reports for central government, although a small and diminishing minority of 
authorities still publish them for local accountability purposes. In addition, other central 
government departments sometimes attach specific conditions to individual funding streams 
or grants that  require local authorities to report back on how the money was spent. 
 
Internal ‘overview and scrutiny’ committees were established by the Local Government Act 
2000. They were intended as a counterbalance to the new executive structures created by that 
Act, which required all large local authorities to introduce either elected mayors or a leader 
and cabinet system. The role of these committees was to develop and review policy and make 
recommendations to the council. Following the Localism Act 2011, councils with executive 
governance arrangements are only required to have one overview and scrutiny committee that 
is independent of the executive. The Act also permitted councils to revert to the previous 
committee system if they so wished – in which case they can operate overview and scrutiny 
committees if they choose, but are no longer required to do so.  
 
Some inter-agency and collaborative working with other local public services is also 
‘horizontally’ scrutinised to a degree in Local Resilience Forums, Health and Wellbeing 
Boards, and Community Safety Partnerships. In terms of expenditure and budgeting, services 
can also use CIPFA’s interactive financial database and interrogative tools to benchmark with 
other bodies. 
 
Local authorities also manage processes of ‘external scrutiny’, in that their committees look 
at issues which lie outside the council’s responsibilities. For example specific powers exist to 
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scrutinise health bodies, crime and disorder partnerships, Police and Crime Commissioners, 
and flood risk management authorities. In the context of growing multiple collaborative 
arrangements and proposals for further devolution of powers to local government, the Centre 
for Public Scrutiny has recently proposed the creation of Local Public Accounts Committees 
to scrutinise the whole range of public spending within a given area (Centre for Public 
Scrutiny 2015a) as a response to this widening gap.  
 
In terms of the health sector, the Department of Health has prepared guidance to help local 
government and their partners scrutinise these services more effectively. However, because 
local authorities commission or provide public health services of their own, as well as 
commission or provide health services to the National Health Service (NHS), they are 
themselves within the scope of health scrutiny legislation. In other words, local authorities 
maybe both scrutineer and scrutinee of health services.  
 
Many local authorities have separate staff and financial resources for overview and scrutiny 
committees, although annual surveys conducted by the Centre for Public Scrutiny indicate 
constantly diminishing resources over the last eight years (Centre for Public Scrutiny 2015b). 
The Centre has recently called on local authorities to ‘up their game’ in respect of scrutiny 
following the scandals associated with children’s services in Rotherham (Centre for Public 
Scrutiny 2014), and a recent report highlighting concerns from officers and councillors that 
they no longer provide sufficient interrogation (Grant Thornton 2015).  
 
Ultimately, local authorities that fail to deliver for their local communities can be voted out 
by their electorate. However, there are a number of external systems in place for intervention 
should they fail to fulfil their functions in terms of the maintenance of regularity, propriety 
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and value for money. In cases affecting an individual for example, the Local Government 
Ombudsman provides an independent route of complaint and redress. For service specific 
failure, such as in children’s services, the relevant government department has in some cases 
put in place specific failure and improvement regimes. In terms of the overall corporate 
performance of a local authority, the LGA is co-ordinating the local government sector in 
providing peer support to local authorities (LGA 2014). As a last resort, central government 
still has powers to investigate and intervene through the Local Government Acts of 1999 and 
2003.   
 
The LGA has a systematic approach to ‘identify’ local authorities that could benefit from 
‘preventative improvement support’. This is based on published financial and service delivery 
data from inspectorates and regulators, data and informal information from peer challenge, 
and ‘informal conversations’ with the sector (LGA 2014). Information sharing arrangements 
are in place between the LGA and government departments and the Inspectorates to ensure 
that the LGA has the intelligence to focus support. Alongside this, the DCLG and Local 
Government’s “Localities” arrangements - where all the senior civil servants in the 
department are twinned with one or more local authorities - offer senior level engagement 
with each local authority area. This arrangement is separate from performance considerations 
and focuses largely on policy and implementation, although information from the 
arrangement is shared where appropriate. These arrangements replaced the much more 
comprehensive network of Government Regional Offices that were also abolished in 2010 by 
the incoming coalition government (DCLG 2010a).   
 
Once an issue has been identified the LGA can initiate a SLI process. If the issue cannot be 
resolved, or if a local authority refused to engage with the SLI, the Secretary of State could 
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commission a corporate governance investigation to ensure a robust evidence base. The 
personal authority to do this follows on from the Local Government Act 1999, and the Local 
Audit and Accountability Act 2014 that abolished the Audit Commission. These Acts also 
give the Secretary of State the power to direct local authorities to take actions, and ultimately 
direct another body to take over specific functions of a local authority, if the authority is 
unwilling to engage with the LGA in light of the evidence gathered after an investigation.  
 
Following the governments’ recent experience of intervention in Doncaster, (Le Grand et al. 
2013), the DCLG has developed a model for handling future interventions, which involves 
working closely with the local government sector. It is debateable whether SLI has been, or 
will be, more effective than central intervention, although even the primary proponents of 
SLI (Bennett et al. 2014) accept the latter will remain an option in order to incentivise local 
authorities to engage with the SLI and provide a fall-back position if the SLI proves 
insufficient.  
 
Theme 5 – Changing the mix of accountability and transparency arrangements may 
involve value for money risks 
 
The challenges of austerity localism for the financial sustainability and resilience of local 
government coupled with significant changes to accountability and transparency 
arrangements raise real and potential value form money risks. For example, central control 
over local government revenue (grants, business rates and council tax) means that an 
individual local authority does not have the means or the flexibility to respond to sudden 
increases in demand, robustly plan for the future, or in some instances, fill growing resource 
gaps. This is only mitigated to a small extent by the introduction of indicative three-year 
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funding agreements and a local authority’s limited ability to raise revenue through fees and 
charges or other sources of income. The NAO’s recent key findings noted that  
 
“Some local authorities are showing persistent signs of fiscal stress particularly 
metropolitan districts,…. (that)… local auditors’ confidence that local authorities can 
make medium-term savings has fallen… (and that) …..auditors are concerned about 
‘funding gaps’ within local authorities medium-term plans, and the risks that could 
prevent authorities delivering savings” (NAO 2014b pp. 9-10).  
 
The statutory requirements of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 concentrate on 
annual financial reporting. This may hinder broader short, medium and long term sustainable 
management of financial and other resources.  
 
These risks are not mitigated by other parts of the performance management and/or public 
assurance regimes, which could be perceived as a weakness of the current regime over 
previous performance and financial assurance arrangements. 
 
The problem is compounded by the abolition of centralised performance monitoring 
frameworks, comparable quality assured indicators and the Audit Commission itself and 
ultimately means that there is insufficient data available on the quality and scope of local 
government services, as well as very limited capacity to interrogate this data effectively. This 
obscures any risks associated with service performance and means an informed judgment of 
the extent to which any local authority provides value for money is all but impossible. 
Armchair auditors have not stepped into the breach to mitigate this risk, and the NAO is 
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limited to undertaking high-level assessments of value for money across the sector, rather 
than within individual local authorities.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has put forward five themes with regards to accountability and transparency 
arrangements in England. Although based on a study of local government, the themes speak 
to an important global debate in both the research and practice of public management about 
public assurance, value for money and underlying performance management arrangements 
(Moynihan 2008; Hood 2010; Bovens, Goodin, and Schillemans 2014; Ferry and Eckersley 
2015a; van Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan 2015). 
 
The paper has implicitly acknowledged that professionalised accountability costs money and 
time. In advanced western liberal democracies, transparency is perceived to be relatively less 
expensive through the capacity and capability of the internet to disseminate large quantities 
of data that citizens readily have access to. It is therefore an attractive option in times of 
austerity and financial cutbacks for policy makers and practitioners to reduce professionalised 
accountability as a means to save money and to promote transparency as a surrogate.  
 
However, an important theme for policy makers, regulators and practitioners is that 
transparency is not a straightforward panacea for a reduction in professionalised 
accountability arrangements. Financial cutbacks alone should not be an acceptable reason to 
undermine and significantly reduce public accountability. This is because in practice for 
many jurisdictions in advanced relatively wealthy western liberal democracies any significant 
loss of professional capacity with regards to information and its interrogation is unlikely to be 
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made up for by an army of armchair auditors that critically analyse and interpret raw data – 
citizens may perceive that they have better things to do, even assuming they had the ability to 
do it. 
 
It is easy to appreciate, if not wholly to agree with nor consider suitable, how financial 
conformance has been allowed to become the main focus of a reduced professionalised 
accountability apparatus as part of cutback management under austerity. The problem is that 
such arrangements are not adequate for the assessment of value for money or for assessing 
the financial resilience or sustainability of public services. This is because such arrangements 
provide significant challenges for governance, leadership and strategic alignment in 
managing risk. Indeed systemic ‘service’ failure becomes a concern as the sole focus 
becomes the budget. This problem is only exacerbated as reporting is partial, scrutiny 
variable and quality assurance reducing as the focus becomes the current financial position 
rather than a comprehensive view of performance. 
 
Mechanisms for early intervention are essential if public services fail or significantly 
underperform. In England, the local government sector has been proactive in devising its own 
SLI initiative. Nevertheless, this requires careful monitoring and considerable improvement if 
it is to be robust and ultimately even its proponents accept the central state may still be 
required to intervene in individual cases (Bennett et al. 2014). 
 
Essentially, any changes in accountability and transparency arrangements inevitably change 
the risk profile with regards to value for money. Operationally it is more difficult to meet 
unforeseen circumstances if there is limited flexibility in funding arrangements. The 
sustainable management of financial and other resources also becomes more difficult if 
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reporting focusses primarily on financial elements, performance management arrangements 
are relatively weaker than what went before, and information is insufficient and inadequate to 
make robust value for money judgements. 
 
Practitioners and policy makers alike must therefore embrace this discussion. If we are to 
have value for money public services, which the citizen has the right to expect, then 
arrangements to properly assess operational performance are just as important and must 
complement those for financial conformance. This should be the case whether public money 
is being used during austerity or in a period of growth. In a liberal democracy the assurance 
of the public that government is providing appropriate stewardship of public money is 
sacrosanct, but so should be the value for money. 
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